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Abstract
Background: Military conflict has been an ongoing determinant of inequitable immunisation coverage in many low- and 
middle-income countries, yet the impact of conflict on the attainment of global health goals has not been fully addressed. 
This review will describe and analyse the association between conflict, immunisation coverage and vaccine-preventable 
disease (VPD) outbreaks, along with country specific strategies to mitigate the impact in 16 countries. 
Methods: We cross-matched immunisation coverage and VPD data in 2014 for displaced and refugee populations. Data 
on refugee or displaced persons was sourced from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
database, and immunisation coverage and disease incidence data from World Health Organization (WHO) databases. 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) databases provided additional data on national and sub-national coverage. The 
16 countries were selected because they had the largest numbers of registered UNHCR “persons of interest” and received 
new vaccine support from Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunisation (GAVI), the Vaccine Alliance. We used national 
planning and reporting documentation including immunisation multiyear plans, health system strengthening strategies 
and GAVI annual progress reports (APRs) to assess the impact of conflict on immunisation access and coverage rates, 
and reviewed strategies developed to address immunisation program shortfalls in conflict settings. We also searched the 
peer-reviewed literature for evidence that linked immunisation coverage and VPD outbreaks with evidence of conflict. 
Results: We found that these 16 countries, representing just 12% of the global population, were responsible for 67% of 
global polio cases and 39% of global measles cases between 2010 and 2015. Fourteen out of the 16 countries were below 
the global average of 85% coverage for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT3) in 2014. We present data from countries 
where the onset of conflict has been associated with sudden drops in national and sub-national immunisation coverage. 
Tense security conditions, along with damaged health infrastructure and depleted human resources have contributed 
to infrequent outreach services, and delays in new vaccine introductions and immunisation campaigns. These factors 
have in turn contributed to pockets of low coverage and disease outbreaks in sub-national areas affected by conflict. 
Despite these impacts, there was limited reference to the health needs of conflict affected populations in immunisation 
planning and reporting documents in all 16 countries. Development partner investments were heavily skewed towards 
vaccine provision and working with partner governments, with comparatively low levels of health systems support or 
civil partnerships. 
Conclusion: Global and national policy and planning focus is required on the service delivery needs of conflict affected 
populations, with increased investment in health system support and civil partnerships, if persistent immunisation 
inequities in conflict affected areas are to be addressed.
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Background
Achieving equity in immunisation outcomes has received 
increased focus from global health agencies, as they expand 
efforts to control, eliminate and eradicate vaccine-preventable 
diseases (VPDs). Geographic location, gender, and socio-
economic status are important factors affecting equitable 
access to immunisation services.1 As well, military conflict 
is a major contextual determinant of lower immunisation 
coverage and is ongoing in many developing countries. 
For example, fighting between government military and 
insurgents in Pakistan has resulted in the displacement of 
millions, with the resulting spread of wild poliovirus to other 
parts of the country.2 In Afghanistan, lack of security and 
immunisation coverage were negatively associated, regardless 
of availability of resources.3 More recently in the Ukraine, 
an outbreak of fighting resulted in a collapse in vaccination 
coverage and outbreaks of both polio and measles.4 Such 
studies are important in understanding the effect of conflict 
on immunisation within countries, as well as on strategies 
to mitigate the impacts of conflict. However, the impact of 
conflict on the attainment of global health goals has not 
been fully addressed. In this review, we describe and analyse 
the impact of conflict on immunisation programs across 
16 high-risk countries that received support from Global 
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Implications for policy makers
The concentration of poor immunisation coverage and vaccine-preventable disease (VPD) outbreaks in conflict-affected populations reinforces the 
notion that there is an intertwining of the political and health security agendas. Inevitably, this means health planners and policy-makers need to seek 
solutions through both health and political dialogue. 
• Global, regional, national and sub-national approaches are critical to addressing imbalances in immunisation service access. Movement of both 
populations and pathogens across borders demonstrates that cross border approaches are required, as illustrated by VPD outbreaks in Central 
Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and more recently in Eastern Europe.
• Humanitarian and development assistance portfolios that reflect a more balanced investment in both commodity and operational support are 
required in conflict settings, particularly for health system support and civil society partnerships.
• Improved articulation of conflict and post conflict immunisation strategy in national immunisation planning and reporting documents will 
enable improved guidance and resource allocation for countries, development partners and for civil agencies.
• Increased policy emphasis on immunisation access in conflict-affected areas will assist health worker and community security, as well as 
improved accessibility to vaccines and related child health interventions.
Implications for the public
Increased awareness of the impact of conflict on immunisation access should provide a focus for resource mobilisation to ensure health services 
reach children in these settings. Deeper understanding of the impact of conflict on immunisation coverage will reduce the risk of disease outbreaks 
in vulnerable populations in conflict affected areas and in internally displaced population camps. This research reinforces a rights approach for 
children’s health and health workers in conflict settings, and in doing so, has the potential to improve strategy, partnerships and advocacy efforts for 
both child protection and health worker security.
Key Messages 
Alliance for Vaccine and Immunisation (GAVI), the Vaccine 
Alliance, with a view to generating themes that inform global 
and national policy on reducing immunisation inequities in 
conflict-affected settings.
Methods and Sources of Data
Sources of data for this review include data bases of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) (reporting on vaccine coverage5 
and disease incidence6), Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) data, and country planning and reporting documents 
available through the GAVI Country Hub.7 The DHS data, in 
combination with disease outbreak and emergency response 
situation reports published online through United Nations 
sources, provided information on sub-national immunisation 
coverage and VPD outbreaks.
To provide background contextual information on the 
issue of immunisation and conflict, a search was conducted 
through the PubMed database8 using the title search terms 
‘immunisation’ and ‘conflict,’ (3 responses) ‘immunization’ 
and ‘conflict,’ (5 responses), ‘vaccination’ and ‘conflict’ 
(4 responses), ‘immunisation’ and ‘war’ (1 response) 
and ‘immunization’ and ‘war’ (6 responses) and finally, 
‘vaccination’ and ‘war’ (23 responses). Of these studies, 
none undertook a global review of the issue of conflict and 
immunisation, although one study attempted to draw global 
lessons from the experience of immunisation and conflict in 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia.9 Other studies from Nigeria,10 
Sierra Leone,11 Central African Republic (CAR),12 Syria,13 
and Nepal14 were highly country specific, and review how 
conflict effects service delivery strategies such as campaigns 
and routine immunisation in conflict affected areas within 
national borders. 
In this review, we adopt a wider-angle view of the impact 
of conflict on immunisation. We do this by describing and 
analysing 3 sets of immunisation planning and reporting 
documents from 16 countries. These documents include 
national multiyear immunisation plans, health system 
strengthening (HSS) strategies and GAVI annual progress 
reports (APRs).7 These planning and reporting documents 
were accessed through the GAVI Country Hub website (https://
www.gavi.org/country/). This site provides information on 
levels of vaccine and financing for each country that is eligible 
for GAVI support. The site also provides access to a set of 
country documents, including the above mentioned national 
multi-year plans, APRs (prepared by each country) and HSS 
proposals financed through GAVI and national governments. 
These 3 sets of documents were emphasized in this analysis as 
they provide a consistent approach as to how countries report 
internationally on immunisation. 
We applied search terms in these documents using the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
classifications (refugees, displaced populations, internally 
displaced person [IDP] or ‘displaced’ populations, stateless 
persons, returnees) to detect specific responses by national 
planners for the provision of immunisation services to 
vulnerable or conflict-affected populations. These same search 
terms were applied for the APR, national comprehensive 
multi-year plans for immunisation (cMYP) and for a country’s 
HSS strategy. Frequencies of mention of search terms were 
presented in tabular format in an Excel spreadsheet. Data 
were also recorded here on documented impacts of conflict 
on immunisation including documentation of immunisation 
strategy in conflict-affected areas. The data from the above 
sources was then cross referenced with UNHCR data for 2014 
as well as with immunisation coverage (2014) and disease 
reporting data (WHO 2010–2015).
Countries were selected for review based on 2 criteria; 
firstly, that the country had 500 000 or more “persons of 
interest” as classified by UNHCR, and secondly that the 
country was eligible for international Global Health Initiative 
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support through GAVI. 
Analysis and Limitations of Study
The review presents an overview of the available information 
on conflict-affected populations in the 16 review countries, 
and data on immunisation coverage and VPD outbreaks. 
Wherever possible, coverage and outbreak data are tracked 
back to sub-national regions where conflict is reported. We 
examine the availability and accessibility of services in conflict 
areas, with a focus on human resources, infrastructure, and 
service delivery. We also reviewed national planning and 
reporting documents to detect country strategies that respond 
to service gaps in conflict-affected areas.
An important methodological limitation of this paper is 
that other social and geographic variables, such as illiteracy, 
poverty and remoteness may confound the impact of conflict 
on immunisation access. We have tried to minimise this risk 
by adopting a wide multinational comparison of the impact 
of conflict on immunisation access and coverage and disease 
outbreaks, and wherever possible analysing subnational data 
and linking this data to reporting of conflict in the same sub-
national areas. 
We have also utilised peer-reviewed sources and evidence 
from within country case studies to confirm overlap of conflict 
settings with low coverage. We cite national countries own 
reporting documents to confirm the direct linkages between 
health system collapse, insecurity, and low coverage in sub-
national regions of a given country. Based on these 3 sources, 
we determine the association between conflict conditions 
and a country’s immunisation service accessibility, coverage, 
and reporting of disease outbreaks. The peer reviewed 
articles were used to provide background information on 
the statement of immunisation and conflict as a global 
health problem. In contrast, the review of the planning 
and reporting documentation was used to systematically 
describe and analyse the policy and planning stance of 
national governments towards the issue of immunisation in 
conflict settings. The main rationale for selection of GAVI 
eligible countries was to enable a systematic cross-country 
comparison of immunisation strategy in conflict settings 
utilizing common data sources and reporting formats. 
Results
Data on Conflict-Affected Populations in 16 Review Countries
The 16 countries have over 21 million persons of interest as 
categorised by UNHCR, of whom 60% are IDPs, 22% refugees 
and 18% other UNHCR category. Persons of interest in this 
sample ranges from 3.6 million in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to just over 500 000 in Chad (Figure 1).
These figures underestimate the true number of people 
affected by conflict, as many in conflict areas do not become 
displaced. However, by focussing on displaced persons and 
refugees (including other ‘persons of interest’ categories such 
as ‘stateless populations’), it is possible to track policy and 
planning responses for arguably the most disadvantaged and 
vulnerable populations affected by conflict.
Immunisation Coverage in Conflict-Affected Countries
WHO data (2014) show that 14 of 16 conflict-affected 
countries have immunisation coverage below the global 
diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT3) average of 85% 
(based on WHO and United Nations Children’s Fund 
[UNICEF] published estimates). Six of 16 countries have 
DTP3 coverage below 50% (see Figure 2).
In total there were 6 874 201 UNHCR classified persons 
of interest in the 6 countries in 2014 with DPT3 coverage 
below 50% (WHO UNICEF Estimates) (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Surveys and peer-reviewed sources indicate that these lower 
national rates are driven by pockets of very low coverage in 
subnational regions, many of which are affected by current or 
historical conflict. 
Figure 3 illustrates the gap between regions within countries 
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Figure 1. Persons of Interest as Classified by the UNHCR in 2014 in 16 Conflict-Affected Countries.15
Note: Countries with data labels have coverage below 50% DPT3 WHO UNICEF Estimates 2014. See Figure 2. Abbreviation: UNHCR, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.
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with the highest and lowest vaccination coverage rates (of all 
8 basic vaccinations of BCG, DPT1-3, Polio 1-3 and measles 
vaccinations) in the 11 countries with available data in the last 
reported DHS survey (2011 and 2015).
Notwithstanding the situation of the very limited access 
by the poor to immunisation services in urban areas where 
displaced persons migrate to from rural areas affected by 
conflict, aggregated population surveys still show that the 
highest coverage rates are often concentrated in central urban 
areas such as Kinshasa in DRC, Addis Adeba in Ethiopia, 
Mandalay in Myanmar, Islamabad in Pakistan, Kampala in 
Uganda, and Aden in Yemen. In contrast, lower coverage 
rates are associated with remote areas and conflict. In DRC, 
the lowest coverage is in Equateur province, which has been 
the location of ongoing conflict between the police and armed 
militants, with Médecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) reporting up 
to 50 000 displaced persons in 2010.17 In Pakistan, the lowest 
regional coverage is in Balochistan (16% fully immunised),18 
where there has been ongoing insecurity for many years. In 
Nigeria, very low coverage is experienced in the North West, 
also an area of ongoing civil unrest. In Myanmar, the second 
lowest regional coverage is in Rakhine State, where inter 
communal violence has occurred over the last 3 to 4 years. In 
Kenya, the lowest coverage is in Mandera, a region bordering 
Somalia with recent cross border attacks by Islamist group al-
Shabbab.19 This conflict has been ongoing since 2011. Finally, 
in Yemen, the lowest regional coverage has been in Sadah, 
a remote north-western province of the country heavily 
implicated in the origins and persistence of the current civil 
war.20
As conflicts have been going on for decades in such 
countries as Myanmar, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and since 
conflicts are often contained in smaller sub regions, it is 
often difficult to provide a before and after conflict picture 
of national immunisation coverage. However there have been 
some recent cases that illustrate how national conflicts can 
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Figure 2. DPT3 Immunisation Coverage 2014 (WHO and UNICEF Estimates) in 16 GAVI Eligible Conflict-Affected Countries, With Clear Bars Showing 
Countries With Coverage <50% Coverage.5
Abbreviations: DPT3, diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus; WHO, World Health Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund.
Figure 3. Coverage of 8 Vaccinations for the Highest and Lowest Coverage Regions Within Countries.16 Abbreviations: DHS,  Demographic and Health 
Survey; DRC, Democratic Republic of Congo.
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lead to a collapse in healthcare and immunisation services 
access. 
Between 2012 and 2013 in Ukraine, immunisation 
coverage had been maintained at 76% (DPT3) (WHO 
UNICEF Estimates) after which it declined sharply to 23% in 
2014 following the commencement of conflict.21 It declined 
further to 19% in 2016. In Yemen between 2013 and 2014, 
the country had coverage levels of 71% and 73% respectively 
(DPT3 WHO UNICEF Estimates), after which the coverage 
declined to 47% in 2015 following the onset of conflict.22 At 
independence in 2011, the DPT3 coverage in South Sudan 
was 75%. But following commencement of civil conflicts 
post-independence, the coverage declined sharply to 46% in 
2014 (DPT3 WHO UNICEF Estimates).23 
Vaccine Preventable Disease Outbreaks in Conflict-Affected 
Countries
Not surprisingly, pockets of low coverage in conflict-affected 
areas contribute to VPDe outbreaks (Table 1). This is most 
marked in the case of polio where the total number of reported 
cases between 2010 and 2015 in the 16 review countries 
(2255 cases) represented 67% of all global cases (3357 cases), 
even though these countries represent just 12% of the global 
population.
Table 2 describes disease outbreaks reported by subnational 
regions affected by conflict. A common theme in the analysis 
of these cases is the association of disease outbreaks with 
population displacement. Overall, since 2010, 13 of the 16 
countries have experienced ether wild polio or circulating 
vaccine derived polio outbreaks since 2010.
As illustrated in Figure 4, although polio cases have been 
tracking down over the last 5 years in line with the trend 
globally, 76% of polio cases were concentrated in the countries 
examined in this review in 2015, with evidence that many 
cases originated within conflict-affected zones or in displaced 
populations within these countries.
These findings are consistent with a recently published 
global review of polio eradication activities, which concluded 
that the incidence of polio was high in areas with increased 
conflict and instability, and that conflict resulted in the re-
emergence of polio in otherwise polio-free countries.52
Documented Impact of Conflict on Immunisation Services
Health Services 
The impact of conflict on immunisation services is widely 
Table 1. Global Polio and Measles Incidence (2010-2015) and Incidence 
in the 16 Countries6,24 
Total Global Population 2015 7 346 705 000
Total population in the 16 countries in 2015 891 277 274
% Global population in the 16 countries in 2015 12.1%
Total global polio cases 2010-2015 3357
Total polio cases in the 16 countries 2010-2015 2255
% Polio cases in the 16 countries as a percentage of 
all global cases (2010-2015)
67%
Total global measles cases 2010-2015 1 688 098
Total measles cases in the 16 countries 663 497
% Measles cases in 16 countries 2010-2015 as a 
percentage of all global cases (2010-2015)
39%
reported in country planning documents, and focus mostly 
on reduced accessibility of services, lower coverage, and 
increased outbreak risk, destroyed health infrastructure and 
vaccine logistics, and depleted human resources. In Sudan, 
war and theft are reported as continuing threats to vaccine 
and logistics systems,53 whereas in South Sudan there is an 
absence of health facilities in conflict- affected areas altogether, 
with only 44% of the population living within 5 km of a health 
facility.54 Ongoing conflicts in rural areas of Afghanistan 
create security problems with shipment of equipment to 
provinces. Insecurity is continuously threatening cold chain, 
transportation, and storage of vaccines.55
In Pakistan, there is a lack of specific service provision for 
IDPs, who instead rely on routine services that are inadequate 
for the existing population.56 In South Sudan, an estimated 
one million people have fled across borders, which has led to 
lack of clarity on population denominators. There is delayed 
implementation due to difficult or no access in some counties 
in South Sudan because of the armed conflict (particularly in 
the 3 most affected states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile) 
resulting in delayed vaccine introductions.57 Most facilities are 
not conducting outreach in these locations.58 In Afghanistan, 
an estimated 2.5 million live in insecure regions, mostly in 
the south, southeast, and west.59 There is much lower access 
to immunisation campaigns in these regions, with reduced 
movements of beneficiaries due to insecurity. In Yemen, 
both measles rubella (MR) and inactivated polio vaccine 
(IPV) vaccine introduction were postponed until 2015 due to 
security unrest.60
Planning for displaced populations is very limited. Only 
one of 14 multiyear plans (14 out of 16 were available) 
contained the search terms “IDP” or “displaced population.” 
Despite UNHCR reporting over 600 000 refugees and asylum 
seekers in Kenya in 2014, neither the multiyear plan for 
immunisation or APR to GAVI (2014) makes any mention of 
services for these groups.61 This was also the case for the over 
800 000 stateless persons in Myanmar. Other than mentioning 
low coverage in Rakhine State, there are no specific strategies 
to expand services for this vulnerable group.62 Nigeria makes 
no mention of strategies to expand access to immunisation 
services for the over 1.1 million UNHCR persons of interest 
in its multi-year immunisation plan.63 
These findings are consistent with an independent review 
of applications for GAVI funding from 19 countries in 2014 
(of which 8 were identified by reviewers as being in conflict). 
It was found that “populations affected by conflict are either 
not mentioned in proposals (invisible), or strategies are not 
described as to how these populations will be reached.”64 
Impact on Human Resources 
A common theme in national documentation is the impact 
of conflict on human resources availability, retention, 
competency, and distribution. In some of these cases, gaps 
in human resources are attributable to health workers fleeing 
conflict-affected areas. In Cote D’Ivoire, the country has been 
divided between the rebel-held north and the government-
controlled south. Many healthcare workers have fled the 
north, with UNICEF reporting serious consequences for 
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Table 2. Polio Outbreaks in the 16 Countries
Country Reported Wild Polio Virus and Circulating Vaccine Derived Polio Virus
Afghanistan
Polio cases in 2016 were concentrated in the southern regions and along the border with Pakistan. Four cases were reported in 2016 from 
Bermel District bordering Pakistan, which is controlled by antigovernment forces.26 The total number of WPV1 cases reported in Afghanistan 
in 2018 is 12 (reported as of September 2018).26
CAR Although no indigenous cases have been reported since 2000, imported cases were reported from Southern Chad and DRC.27
Chad
An outbreak was reported in 2010 from a newly imported case from Northern Nigeria, with absent/destroyed health infrastructure across 
Chad facilitating further spread.28 Chad experienced outbreaks of both wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1 – 65 cases in 2011) and wild poliovirus 
type 3 (WPV3 – 3 cases) in 2011.29
Cote D’Ivoire
17 cases of polio re-emerged in the north of the country following the crisis in the north.30 Since 2002 the country has been divided between 
the rebel-held north and the government-controlled south, with many healthcare workers fleeing from the north.31 In 2011 Côte d'Ivoire 
experienced an outbreak of WPV3 with 3 new cases reported with onset of paralysis in 2011.32 
DRC
In 2010, an estimated 2.6 million people lived away from home in DRC.  There were 100 polio cases in 2010, and in 93 cases in 2011. Efforts 
to prevent polio have been complicated by conflict and insecurity including displacement of 2.5 million people.33 Two separate cVDPV2s have 
been confirmed in 2017.34
Ethiopia
Highest risk areas for polio transmission were from the Somali region of Ethiopia, where the last cases occurred in 2013.35 There were 
10 confirmed WPV cases in 2013. The affected area is characterised by insecurity, weak infrastructure and communication.36 The country 
is currently (2018) conducting a polio campaign to focus on pastoralist, refugees, IDPs, hard to reach and border areas and cross-border 
surveillance with Somalia.37
Kenya 
A 4-month-old girl from near Dadaab (refugee camp with estimated population of 500 000) developed ADP in 2013. Two contacts tested 
positive for WPV1. Risk is considered high in this region, due to large scale population movements across the Horn of Africa.38
Myanmar
Two cases of cVDPV were detected in Rakhine State in 2017, the location of recent communal conflicts, and where in some of the Townships 
only 27% of children received 3 doses of polio vaccine.39
Pakistan
54 polio cases reported in 2015, with cases concentrated in conflict affected border regions.40 In 2016, cVDPV2 was detected from 
environmental samples in Quetta, Balochistan. 19 WPV cases were also detected in the same year. The area affected is part of a cross border 
common reservoir for WPV1 that extends into Southern Afghanistan.41
Nigeria 
Two polio cases were detected in Northern province of Borno, demonstrating the need to prioritise services in the Lake Chad Region (often 
affected by conflict and large population movements).42 The Government reported 3 laboratory-confirmed WPV1 cases in 2016 from Borno 
State.43
Somalia During a polio outbreak in 2007, there were 228 cases, mostly from IDP.44  Circulation of cVDPV2 has been confirmed in Somalia in 2018.45
South Sudan 2 cases of cVDPV were confirmed from IDPs in Unity State (conflict-affected region of the South) in 2014.46
Sudan
The last reported polio cases were in 2009, and the country has been polio free since then. High risk areas remain in border areas with Chad 
in Darfur State.47 The earlier outbreaks were initially restricted to southern Sudan and western Ethiopia, after which cases spread to northern 
Sudan (in Khartoum and Port Sudan).48
Uganda A polio case detected in the Bugiri district in mid-October 2010.49 
Ukraine
Low coverage is amplified by ongoing conflict and displacement in the east. Two cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1 have 
been confirmed in 2015,50 along with 3667 cases of rubella, 2937 cases of pertussis, and 995 cases of mumps.4
Yemen
There are an estimated 14.8 million that have no access to health services, with WHO launching large scale campaigns to prevent polio and 
measles.51
Abbreviations: WPV1, wild polio virus type 1; DRC, the Democratic Republic of Congo; cVDPV2s, circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2s; IDP, internally 
displaced person; ADP, acute flaccid paralysis; WHO, World Health Organization; WPV, wild polio virus; WPV 3, wild polio virus type 3;  cVDPV, circulating 
vaccine-derived poliovirus.
children.65 In some cases, health workers have been subject 
to acts of violence. In Pakistan, there was a targeted killing 
of polio workers resulting in the death of 22 polio workers 
and 4 police officers,66 and in Nigeria, at least 9 young women 
working on a polio vaccination campaign were targeted and 
killed by gunmen in 2 separate incidents in Kano, the regional 
capital of Northern Nigeria in 2013.67
There is a critical shortage of health workers in South 
Sudan, with a midwife/nurse to population ratio of 0.2 per 
10 000.54 In Somalia, deterioration of the security situation 
in 2012 meant that the recruitment of Lady Health Workers 
was hampered in South Central zones.68 In North Sudan, 
mechanisms for retention and equitable deployment in 
remote and conflict-affected areas are not well developed, 
resulting in the location of over 70% of the health workforce 
in urban areas.69 In Myanmar, recruitment and retention of 
the health workforce in conflict-affected States bordering 
China and India has been a long-standing program challenge, 
necessitating the implementation of “special outreach” 
programs to reach underserved populations.70 Meanwhile, 
in the Ukraine, one WHO report found that only 30% of the 
medical personnel were left to care for the sick in one city in 
the conflict-affected east of the country. In Donetsk Oblast 
there are 10%-15% fewer medical personnel compared to 
the 85 000 that were based there before the crisis, leading to 
a collapse in polio immunisation coverage to between 30% 
and 40%.71 The human resource depletion in conflict-affected 
areas in some cases is leading to a strengthened role for 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in settings such as 
CAR,72 Afghanistan,73 and in Yemen.74
Impact on Information and Planning
The limited mention of displaced people in planning and HSS 
strategies raises real concern that such populations are not 
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being adequately included in population denominators, or 
in consultation or decision-making processes. For example, 
South Sudan reports that over one million people have 
migrated from the 3 most affected States to other countries, 
and leaves open the question of the destination of these 
people and the geographic denominator to which they will 
now belong.58 Over 500 000 displaced persons are in camps in 
Kenya, but there is lack of mention of this group in the APRs.61 
In Myanmar, years of internal conflict along border regions 
with China have led to migratory movements to harder to 
reach areas, with primary care midwives not including such 
populations in head counts due to barriers to access.70
Country Strategies to Expand Access of Immunisation Services 
to Populations Affected by Conflict
Most countries describe a mix of strategies for service delivery 
in conflict-affected areas including campaign and outreach 
services, supported by civil society partnerships and volunteer 
networks that are tailored to local security conditions (see 
Table 3).
Eight of 16 countries do not describe a specific strategy 
for conflict-affected situations in any of the 3 planning 
documents. In the multiyear plans for immunisation, only 1 
out of the 16 countries mention the term “IDP” or “displaced” 
populations in their national strategic planning document, 
reflecting an overall lack of planning emphasis on the needs 
of these groups.
Seven countries describe an enhanced role of NGOs/civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in conflict-affected settings with 
services contracted out to NGOs in 31 of the 34 provinces 
of Afghanistan.55 Planners observed in Myanmar that in a 
“complex landscape of remote, geographically dispersed, non-
government control and border areas together with migrant 
and other ethnic groups, increasing access to immunisation 
is only successful through the involvement of CSOs and 
NGOs.”70
Six countries describe non-routine campaign or additional 
outreach services as main strategies, reflecting both the 
dearth of permanent health workforce and infrastructure in 
conflict-affected regions. Only 2 countries describe a specific 
communication strategy with combatants or local authorities 
to enable access to populations in conflict-affected areas. In the 
DRC, the annual report to GAVI in 2014 states that “specific 
strategies to reach the children in remote areas were not 
established, particularly in health zones with armed conflicts 
and having no help.”76 In the Annual Reports to GAVI, only 3 
out of 14 countries mention “IDP” or “displaced” populations, 
despite the fact UNHCR reports significant numbers of these 
populations in these countries (ranging from 0.7% of the 
population in Ethiopia to 21.6% of the population in CAR).
Global Health Initiative Financing in Conflict-Affected States
Between 2010 and 2016, there have been 63 new or 
underutilised vaccine introductions to the 16 countries under 
review. Figure 5 illustrates the reported disbursements of 
funds by GAVI since its inception to the 16 countries.
The civil society investment represents less than 1% of 
the GHI investment in these countries, and the HSS/CSO 
investment together represents less than 10% of the overall 
investment portfolio. GAVI requests that governments finance 
CSOs through the HSS funding window of support. However, 
the overall investment in both HSS and CSO windows is less 
than 12% of the value of the total GAVI investment in the 16 
countries under review. 
GAVI has implemented several policy options to improve 
vaccine access for children in these settings. A fragile states 
policy has been developed, which prioritises ‘country tailored’ 
approaches to coverage improvement.77 Aspects of the fragile 
states approach by GAVI include support for development 
of vaccine stockpiles for humanitarian emergencies, 
reprogramming of HSS support in emerging conflict situations, 
and finally, increased access by civil society organisations to 
lower price vaccines in humanitarian emergency settings.78 
The new vaccines policy also provides a coverage cut off point 
for new vaccine introduction of 70% DPT3. In support of its 
overall global goals, GAVI has also developed an increased 
policy focus on immunisation equity.79
Discussion
Summary of Main Findings
We found that low immunisation coverage and VPD outbreaks 
are of major concern in conflict-affected countries, especially 
in the sub regions most affected by conflict. Common features 
of the impact of conflict included destroyed infrastructure, 
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depleted human resources, delayed vaccine introductions and 
delayed campaign implementation, and limited accessibility 
to services. Outbreaks of VPD have had a substantial impact 
on attainment of global immunisation disease elimination 
and eradication goals. This has been confirmed by other 
studies. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) mid-
term strategic plan evaluation demonstrates that conflict and 
insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and 
increased instability in Pakistan, are a major factor in limiting 
access of immunisation services to children.80 
Lessons from Nigeria, Somalia, and Pakistan illustrate that 
operational tactics such as security assessments, negotiating 
secure physical access, engaging local communities, 
coordination of humanitarian aid deliveries, transit or cross 
border vaccination strategy, collaboration with the military or 
other security personnel are all tactical strategies applied to 
assist reduction of VPD morbidity and mortality in conflict 
settings.9 However, this review has found that many national 
Table 3. Service Delivery Strategies for Conflict-Affected Populations Described in APRs (2014), HSS Proposals or the Most Recent Multi-Year Immunisation 
Plan
Country Service Delivery Strategy Identified in National Policy and Planning Documentation
Afghanistan
Increase immunisation delivery points, aggressive mobile outreach to isolated communities, and provision of services through private 
providers in insecure areas. This includes contracting out of health service delivery to NGOs in 31 out of 34 provinces. Locally tailored 
solutions through provincial management structures in insecure areas are considered important.
Chad
Implementation of SIAs are conducted to address gaps in routine services. There is a high reliance on NGOs and international support to 
provide services for refugees in the east and south of the country. 
CAR Advocacy measures are conducted with multinational forces for improved security to support vaccine introductions. There are activities to 
support intensification of routine immunisation, and there are increased roles for NGOs in zones of insecurity.
Cote D'Ivoire
Despite reports of over 700 000 stateless persons, as well as instability in the north and east of the country, no specific strategies are described 
for conflict-affected populations. 
DRC
A plan for refugees is described, including an emergency stock of vaccines and development of guidelines for immunisation for displaced 
populations. Elsewhere it states that specific strategies to reach the children in health zones with armed conflicts are not yet developed.
Ethiopia Fixed immunisation posts have been established at cross border sites where there are large population movements.
Kenya
No specific strategy is described for displaced populations, despite this country having the largest displaced population camp in the world. 
The comprehensive multiyear plan identifies a high reliance on NGOs, which operate 54% of health facilities in the country.
Myanmar
Special outreach programs are implemented in remote areas and those affected by armed conflict. Planning documents identify increased 
roles for NGOs in border areas or areas under non-government control. 
Nigeria No specific strategies are described in 3 documents (APR, HSS, or cMYP).
Pakistan
The country uses existing services to reach displaced populations. Vaccinators utilise 60-80 days per year for national Immunisation Days 
strategy.
Somalia
Child Health Days are implemented in all urban, rural, and hard to reach areas, although security was viewed as a barrier to implementation. 
The multi-year plan for immunisation also mentions expanding routine immunisation outlets for IDPs.
The Sudan
Plans are described to (a) implement integrated service delivery strategy in emergency settings, elsewhere described as "accelerated routine 
activities." (b) Expand immunisation coverage in security compromised areas largely through limited "hit- and- run or acceleration campaign 
approach" facilitated by CSOs and NGOs. (c) open a channel of communication with armed groups through local leaders and UN agencies 
along with involvement of NGOs.
South Sudan
No specific strategies are described in 2 available national documents (GAVI, APR, and HSS). However, the HSS strategy does outline 
contractual/MOU mechanisms with civil society organisations. Elsewhere UNICEF and the World Food program have initiated a RRM using 
food distribution and support registration and health services for conflict affected populations.75
Uganda No specific strategies are described, despite barriers to immunisation being noted in the conflict-affected north.
Ukraine No data available.
Yemen
Enhancement of routine immunisation in conflict-affected areas is identified, including more frequent outreach and mobile strategies. 
Increased roles for CSOs in conflict areas that lack public services are also described.
Abbreviations: NGOs, non-governmental organisations; SIAs, supplementary immunisation activities; APR, annual progress report; HSS, health system 
strengthening; cMYP, comprehensive multi-year plans for immunisation; IDPs, internally displaced people; CSOs, civil society organizations; DRC, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund; RRM, rapid response mechanism; MOU, memoranda of understanding; UN, United Nations; CAR, 
Central African Republic.
Figure 5. Pattern of GAVI Financial Support to 16 Conflict-Affected 
Countries.7 Abbreviations: CSO, CSOs, civil society organizations; HSS, 
health system strengthening.
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governments are failing to articulate strategies that meet the 
needs of displaced or conflict-affected populations within 
their borders. The limited analysis in multiyear planning 
documents, HSS strategies and major donor APRs about 
immunisation service access and conflict raises the question 
as to why national documentation is so light in this area, 
when equity of access is clearly a priority for both national 
governments and Global Health Initiatives such as GAVI. 
This may be partly attributable to the fact that in many of 
these settings, governments are either in conflict with sections 
of their own populations, or alternately, are not willing to 
establish health infrastructure and services for populations 
that have crossed national borders. The stated aims of the 
Global Health Initiative to expand vaccine access for the most 
disadvantaged may be problematic when the State is in direct 
conflict with populations within its own borders. This was 
evident in a study of the polio outbreak in Syria in 2013 that 
found that international organisations, due to their mandate 
to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian government, were 
not able to prevent and contain disease outbreaks in rebel-
controlled areas.81 
The concentration of poor immunisation coverage and 
disease outbreaks in conflict-displaced populations reinforces 
the notion that there is an intertwining of political and health 
security agendas. This aligns with a recent global report 
on the ‘weaponization of healthcare’ that recommended 
improved operational support for health workers working 
in rebel-controlled areas, including tighter enforcement of 
principles of medical neutrality in all conflict settings.82 This 
means that there is a need for national planners to seek out 
solutions through both health and political dialogue. At 
the local level, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan report 
that the key ingredient for success in conflict settings will 
most likely result from careful development of a local area 
communication strategy with local authorities, religious 
leaders, and combatants.83
Implications for Global Health Policy and Practice
The lack of policy and planning focus on the association 
between conflict and low immunisation coverage is 
contributing to wide within-country disparities in 
immunisation coverage, and, as illustrated by the findings in 
this paper on polio outbreaks, threatens to derail policy and 
planning initiatives for global equity in immunisation access. 
Movement of populations and pathogens across borders 
demonstrates that cross border approaches are required, 
as illustrated by either polio or measles disease outbreaks 
in Central Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and more 
recently in Eastern Europe. 
Despite the emphasis of Global Health Initiative investments 
on fragile states and inequity reductions, there is a still a 
disconnect between the pattern of investment (reflected by 
high levels of investment in commodities see Figure 5) and 
the real needs of systems in conflict and post conflict areas 
(reflected in comparatively lower levels of investment in 
health systems support). More balanced humanitarian and 
development assistance portfolios are required in conflict 
settings, particularly given the stated need of countries for 
health system support and civil society partnerships. This is 
attributable in large part to the acute shortage of professional 
human resources in these areas, and the heavy reliance on 
NGOs and volunteers to address the gap in service provision. 
Limitations in health outreach, interruptions to campaigns, 
and delayed new vaccine introductions all track back to 
a human resource problem and under investment in the 
resourcing of health operations. 
This recommendation highlights the valuable distinction 
between health system support and HSS,84 with HSS referring 
to more upstream development of management systems, 
with the concept of health system support focusing more on 
provision of essential system inputs for rebuilding routine 
immunisation services in emergency settings. Critical areas 
for investment include human resources placement and 
retention, financing the operational costs associated with 
ensuring mobility and security for these workers, maintaining 
the cold chain, and investment in partnerships with civil 
organisations who have more ready access to hard to reach 
populations. 
Conclusion
Improved articulation of conflict immunisation strategy 
in national level immunisation planning and reporting 
documents will provide significant advantages to managers 
and populations from several perspectives. Better 
understanding of operational approaches in conflict settings 
may enable improved guidance for countries, development 
partners and for civil agencies in ensuring health worker 
and community security, as well as improved accessibility to 
vaccines and related child health interventions for populations 
in conflict settings. Global policy and strategy dialogue 
are urgently needed to devise best practice approaches and 
investment pathways for rebuilding human resources and 
delivery systems in conflict areas. The widespread impact 
of conflict on immunisation access and resulting disease 
outbreaks in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and more 
recently in Eastern Europe, provides a strong rationale for 
improve technical guidance on how planners can mitigate the 
impact of conflict on the attainment of global health goals. 
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